This paper studies a public …rm's investment decision and whether to raise the equity capital needed using the public market (SEO) or a private channel (PIPE, Private Investment in Public Equity). Issuing the security privately allows the …rm to enjoy greater …nancial ‡exibility since funds can be raised faster due to less legal requirements and marketing e¤orts than a public o¤ering (i.e. the shares do not need to be registered before they are sold). This greater …nancial ‡exibility also alleviates information asymmetries. However because they are initially illiquid, they carry a cost. The trade-o¤ is therefore between liquidity and the value of …nancial ‡exibility.
created unwanted "death spirals" and granted them adjectives as "toxic convertibles". All this gave them the ugly duck tag from the …nancial community and prevented them to grow more widely.
Lately, however, practitioners seem to agree that PIPEs are becoming a more mature market: larger …rms are making use of it and most of the structured securities have become rare. 3 Given the current state of this market, the trade-o¤ between private and public placements becomes more relevant. The paper's purpose is therefore to be able to throw light on such dimension of a typical public …rm's …nancing.
The paper draws on an important advantage of a private placement, namely, greater …nancial ‡exibility. It has been argued that one of the main advantages of PIPEs is that it allows to raise money faster than other channerls. Financial ‡exibility has been de…ned, in general, as the …rm's ability to access and restructure its …nancing with low transaction costs. 4 In this paper, …nancial ‡exibility refers to a …rm's ability to time investment and …nancial decisions in such a way that it maximizes gross returns by investing earlier and it also minimizes dilution costs caused by asymmetries of information. To be even more precise, we model this ‡exibility in a two-dimensional way: If funds are raised earlier this provides an advantage over competitors in the industry and expected pro…ts from investing increase, so delaying is costly. However, by delaying the investment and eliminating the time gap between announcing it and obtaining the necessary funds, (sophisticated) investors are provided with a better signal about the …rm's pro…tability. This alleviates potential dilution costs stemming from asymmetries of information. The …rm, if possible, optimally chooses investment timing by taking into account both e¤ects. The relative advantage of a private placement sits on the value created by this ‡exibility. In contrast, a public placement is more time consuming and because it is sold to a pool of relatively less sophisticated investors the potential bene…ts of a more precise signal cannot be enjoyed by the …rm. The comparative advantage of a public placement, on the other hand, is the bene…t of an ex-post more liquid newly issued stock. Equity issued in a public placement becomes immediately liquid (i.e., tradeable in a secondary market), whereas that issued in a private placement su¤ers from temporary illiquidity, as we have argued. In a scenario where investors might be shocked with liquidity needs, PIPEs create an illiquidity cost that needs to be priced in. This illiquidity in turn feeds back into the optimal timing problem by amplifying dilution costs. 4 See Gamba and Triantis (2008) . 5 Arguably, a bank loan would provide the same type of …nancial ‡exibility advantage as a private placement. There are two reasons why we leave bank loans out of the picture. First, the paper seeks to stress the private vs. public dimension of an equity issuance. Secondly, most companies issuing new equity might lack the collateral and/or the We show that when …rms choose a private placement an equilibrium exists for the optimal timing decision. We …nd that …rms facing a larger illiquidity cost choose to invest later. This is because in a more illiquid market the mispricing factor caused by asymmetric information worsens, thus increasing the marginal bene…t of delaying the announcement of the investment decision in order to capture the bene…ts of a more precise signal about the …rm's pro…tability. By the same reason, investment scale also increases the marginal bene…t of delaying investment more so than the direct cost. Finally, the e¤ect of internal funds goes in the opposite way by the same argument. Also, lowering the expected gross return from the new project makes the company invest sooner, the reason being that the marginal dilution cost is lower and it pays to invest sooner in order to rip o¤ some rents from competitors.
In sum, if …rms choose to issue a PIPE, …rms in a more liquid market, with lower investment cost, more internal funds and lower expected pro…ts from the investment will make the company invest sooner. The model derives a closed-form solution for the PIPE discount due to illiquidity, which is proportional to the expected returns from the investment and a measure of how severe such illiquidity is.
Depending on the cost of illiquidity the equilibrium exhibits the use of a private placement or a public one instead. Intuitively, as long as illiquidity costs are not too large but asymmetries are important, …rms will choose to place new equity issues privately. On the other hand, if asymmetries are less important …rms will tend to issue publicly since the value of …nancial ‡exibility is lower. Similarly, if competition is less important it is likely that …rms will issue publicly. This is largely consistent with some empirical facts. First, PIPEs are more common among smaller and younger …rms and also among …rms where timing and competition matters (high-tech industries, pharmaceutical, biotech and medical devices). Second, Gomes and Phillips (2005) …nd that the probability of public …rms issuing private over public is positively related with their measures of asymmetric information for all security types. This is also con…rmed in Wu (2004) .
We then generalize the analysis to debt contracts and show that within the private dimension of security issuance the pecking order might not hold. The main reason why this result arises is the endogeneity of dilution costs. Given that the …rm might choose investment timing, this a¤ects both dilution costs and the net present value of the project. Because with a debt contract the …rm only makes pro…ts if there is no default, the optimal investment timing will be a¤ected by this, and it will likely have the …rm invest earlier than with an equity contract, causing dilution costs to be higher …nancial performance to qualify for bank loans, or might not want be willing to increase leverage ratios. We will however deal with the debt/equity dicotomy in the last section of the paper. and pro…ts potentially lower. This paper can be included as part of the large body of literature on corporate …nancing under asymmetric information (for a survey of articles see Tirole (2006) .) Although this is the …rst paper, to my knowledge, that models a …rm's choice between private and public placement of securities, the trade-o¤ is somewhat related to the study of the decision to go public (see for instance, Subrahmanyam and Titman (1999), Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1999) among others.) Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1999) argue that by going public …rms bene…t from greater bargaining power against dispersed investors (who are better diversi…ed that a venture capitalist) however it also carries higher information production costs. A part from the fact that we study the investment and …nancing decision of a …rm that is already public, we do not focus on either information costs or diversi…cation arguments.
The empirical literature on PIPEs can be broadly summarized with two main …ndings: one, that unlike SEOs, …rms announcing PIPEs observe, on average, positive stock price e¤ects; the other, that the new stock is sold at a discount (Wu (2004) reports median issue discounts of about 15 to 20 percent.) Consistent with our model, the issuance at a discount is widely attributed to illiquidity.
The positive announcement e¤ect is still a puzzle, at least from a theoretical perspective. The model helps better understanding the reason why that might be the case. In short, the reason why an SEO triggers a negative stock price reaction is that with asymmetric information, "good" …rms might …nd unpro…table to invest if the mispricing factor is large enough. If only "bad" …rms are willing to invest, announcing an SEO fully reveals a …rm's type and the stock price drops. This assumes that the investment opportunity is expected. In our model, PIPEs alleviate the mispricing factor (dilution cost) and allow "good" …rms to invest in a positive NPV project that would not be …nanced if only public placements were available. If that is the case, announcing a PIPE should not carry a negative stock price reaction. If additionally, the new project is unanticipated by the market, it can trigger a positive reaction. This is consistent with the …ndings in Gomes and Phillips (2005) . They …nd that stock market returns around equity issues are negatively related with the degree of asymmetric information for public equity but the reverse holds for private equity o¤erings.
A summary of the empirical evidence is in order so that we can link our results with the data.
Hertzell, Lemmon, Linck and Rees (2002) is one of the latest papers con…rming that while public issues, on average, are associated with negative stock-price e¤ects, private issues are associated with positive.
As mentioned earlier, Gomes and Phillips (2005) …nd that the probability of public …rms issuing private over public is positively related with their measures of asymmetric information for all security types (this is also con…rmed in Wu(2004) .) They also …nd that stock market returns around equity issues are negatively related with the degree of asymmetric information for public equity but the reverse holds for private equity o¤erings. The authors claim that it is evidence consistent with the view that public investors believe that private investors produce or obtain valuable information, and learning about private investments is more valuable when there is higher degree of asymmetric information. Wruck and Wu (2007) …nd that relationships create value in private placements. Of particular importance are new relationships created as part of the transaction. Price discounts are smaller when a relationship is involved. This holds for both pre-existing and newly formed relationships. This is consistent with the idea that investors play a certi…cation role. Innovative …rms, as measured in terms of patent applications, make placements at a relatively small discount. In contrast, …rms in new economy industries make placements at a substantial discount.
Wu (2004) also …nds that private placements investors do not engage in more monitoring than public o¤erings investors. This further supports our assumption that (sophisticated) investors might bene…t from signals in a private placement but do not necessarily engage in active monitoring or information production. He also …nds that discounts for private placements sold to managers are higher than discounts for private placements in which managers do not participate. Our model assumes that managers are aligned with existing (old) shareholders and therefore does not make prediction in that regard.
Finally, Brophy, Ouimet and Sialm (2004) focus on the di¤erences between structured and traditional PIPEs. Hedge funds invest the most in the …rst type. In the short term, the average PIPE studied has an average abnormal return of 3.87 percent over a ten-day window around the closing date of the deal, con…rming previous results in private placements by Wruck (1989) . Furthermore, consistent with HLLR they …nd the (counter-intuitive) result that PIPE issuers, on average, experience negative long-term returns after positive announcement returns. The poor long-term performance of companies issuing PIPEs con…rms Barclay, Holderness and Sheehan (2003) and Wu (2004) ,who document that investors in private placements are typically passive and do not appear to increase …rm value through monitoring. They …nd no abnormal performance in …rms issuing traditional PIPEs sold to non-hedge fund investors, and signi…cant negative abnormal performance following the PIPE issuance if the traditional security is bought by a hedge fund. 6 
Investment Technology, Information and Security Choice
The model has three dates, indexed t = 0; 1 and 2: We simplify the model by assuming a discount rate of 0. At t = 0, a public …rm with available (i.e., liquid) cash- ‡ows A has an investment opportunity.
Such investment opportunity can be thought of as a "deepening investment." The investment requires a deterministic out ‡ow of funds I: This investment cost must be paid at time x 2 [0; 1], that is, at some time between date 0 and date 1: The investment timing x might be an endogenous decision of the …rm, depending on the type of security chosen by them. At t = 0 the …rm also faces the decision whether to raise capital using the public market (e.g., through a Secondary/Seasoned Equity O¤ering, or SEO) or placing the security privately (via a Private Placement in Public Equity, or PIPE).
There are two states of nature, success (S) and failure (F:) In each state, gross …rm value is
The information about the probability of each state occurring is asymmetric. As common in principal-agent models, managers possess superior information. In particular, …rms can be of two types, indexed H and L. If the project is undertaken and an SEO is used, an H type …rm generates R S with probability v H = v + H v + v=2: Its prior probability is : On the other hand, L type …rms yield R S with probability v L = v + v=2 and prior probability 1 : We assume that v > 0 and H v > 0 and v + v + H v < 1: At t = 0; this information is known to managers but not to shareholders. In contrast if the company decides to use a private placement, an H type …rm generates R S with probability
2 ). We now justify this di¤erence in probabilities depending on the channel used to raise funds.
A key feature of the paper is to stress the greater ‡exibility, in terms of raising money, a private placement (PIPE) entails over a public o¤ering (SEO). The main idea is that it takes time to raise funds through an SEO. Public o¤erings are usually underwritten and marketed by an investment bank, and have to ful…ll several SEC requisites. In sum, an SEO is more time consuming than a PIPE. In order to capture this idea, we assume that if the …rm uses an SEO, a gap exists between the time the investment is announced/decision is made (t = 0) and the time the funds are received by the company (t = 1). See Figure 1 below for an illustration of this. The lack of …nancial ‡exibility which we de…ne as the existence of a lag between deciding to invest and obtaining the funds for the actual investment is costly in two ways.
First, by raising the funds only at t = 1 the expected pro…tability is lower. The intuition is that the later you invest the more likely it is that a competitor will be able to reap the bene…ts from the deepening investment. Therefore, we implicitly have in mind an industry model where similar …rms simultaneously undertake similar investments, and there exists a …rst mover advantage. We model this assuming that the investing away from t = 0 carries a cost. We assume that this cost is proportional to the expected returns on the investment project and equal to Secondly, deciding early on the investment prevents sophisticated investors from having more information about the company. In other words, the later the announcement is made the more likely some signal about the …rm's pro…tability will provide information to sophisticated investors. Delaying the investment decision away from t = 0 carries out an informational advantage. We argue that the closest to t = 1 the investment decision is made, the less severe the information symmetry (and hence dilution cost) is. In particular, the …rm's choice of the investment timing a¤ects the informativeness of a signal about the project's quality, a signal observed only by sophisticated investors. The way this is advantageous for a PIPE issuance is because it is precisely sophisticated investors those who invest in PIPEs, whereas the proportion of sophisticated investors in SEOs is relatively lower. 6 Also, the decision on the amount of shares to be issued in a public o¤ering is taken at t = 0 due to the 6 At the issuance stage we do not distinguish between informed and uninformed investors in the sense that we assume no information production about the project's quality/return. Note that this set-up is di¤erent from Fulghieri and Lukin (2001) , where informed investors learn private information before the issuance. relatively lower …nancial ‡exibility assumed. To model this formally, we look for a functional form for the probability that a particular signal will convey information for a given …rm type, P (s = s i j v i ); that satis…es the following properties.
De…nition We call a Proportionally Increasingly Informative signal a probability function P (s = s i j v i ) that satis…es the following properties:
i) It is an a¢ ne function of the investment decision time, x;
ii) the signal is completely uninformative at x = 0 and completely informative at x = 1: That is, the posterior probability function after Bayesian updating are
Lemma 1. There exists a PII signal probability function. It is given by
The posterior probabilities given such probability functions are
Proof. See Appendix.
In …gure 1 we plot these probability functions along with the implied posteriors (for = .) The straight-line posterior corresponds to a convenient subcase where k = . We will use this probability function throughout the paper, for tractability reasons. It is immediate to see that the posterior probability corresponding to k = simpli…es to
[ Figure 2 about here]
Armed with this convenient expression for the signal's probability as a function of the time the …rm announces and raises funds, we proceed with the description of the rest of the model's ingredients.
In sum, because issuing securities to the public requires time, funds can only be raised at t = 1
and not before, however the decision must be made in the initial period. If, at t = 0; the …rm decides to use the public market, it announces the issuance of new shares to new investors. On the other hand, a PIPE allows a …rm to raise the amount as soon as t = 0 if the …rm …nds it optimal to do so. Hence, the investment decision is made simultaneously to obtaining the investment funds. This assumption captures the advantage of the private market we seek to highlight in this paper: greater (…nancial) ‡exibility.
The other important element in the model is liquidity needs by investors. The bene…t of raising funds faster comes at a cost. Private placements allow …rms to issue new stock prior to registering it. But, because the stock is typically unregistered when the deal takes place, it is illiquid for a while (investors are not able to sell it in the public trading market.) In particular, restricted private placements (known as Regulation D) place restrictions on both the way these securities can be resold and the time until they can be sold in the public market: two years. Even the so-called Registered placements, which incorporate e¤ective registration statements that cover the resale of securities, have some degree of illiquidity (cite.) We postpone until the next subsection the exact modelling of this liquidity issue.
The information about the probability of each state occurring is asymmetric. As common in principal-agent models, managers possess superior information. In particular, …rms can be of two types, indexed H and L. If the project is undertaken, an H type …rm generates R S with probability
2 ): Its prior probability is : On the other hand, L type …rms yield R S with probability
2 ) (prior probability: 1 :) We assume that v > 0 and H v > 0 and v + v + H v < 1: At t = 0; this information is known to managers but not to shareholders. The payo¤ of the project is realized at t = 2 and …rm value is then given by
If on the other hand the …rm decides not to undertake the deepening investment …rm values are
Moreover, we shall assume:
Agents and Markets'Description
In order to model liquidity we use the approach by Gorton and Pennachi (1990) and Bolton and Von Thadden (1998), among others. Shareholders/Investors have liquidity needs in the future, which arise either in period 1 or period 2; such that some investors (denoted "early consumers") derive utility from consumption at t = 1 and the rest derive utility from consuming at t = 2 ("late" consumers.) Investors are risk neutral. At time 0 however, these needs are unknown to everyone and such uncertainty is not realized until period 1: Since investors do not know exactly when will they like to consume at the time they buy their shares, it is apparent that some trade will occur in the second period: early consumers would like to sell their share in the …rm and buy the consumption good whereas late consumers might want to buy those shares in exchange for their period 2 consumption good endowment in order to consume more at t = 2. Let us introduce some additional notation. At t = 1 the proportion of investors that are early consumers can take the value e h or e l with prior probability q h and q l respectively. We assume that e h > e l : In addition to their share in the …rm, investors receive and endowment of c units of the consumption good (one can think of it as money.) Each unit of this consumption good can either be consumed at t = 1 or stored to yield a certain return of one unit of the consumption good at t = 2. In order to solve for the equilibrium of the issuance model we start solving for the trading part of the model. We denote P ij the stock price at date 1 when the …rm's investment opportunity is of the i type and the proportion of early consumers is e j . It is obvious that at t = 1 early consumers will wish to sell their stock and purchase the consumption good whereas late consumers are the only ones from whom early consumers can buy endowment of the consumption good. Therefore late consumers will end up buying some or all of their period 1 endowment of the consumption good. The following assumption guarantees no storage in equilibrium, that is, late consumers will sell their consumption endowment to early consumers instead of storing.
Given these liquidity needs by investors, the choice of market by the …rm will a¤ect the trading outcome and the equilibrium utilities of investors/shareholders. The crucial di¤erence between a public o¤ering and a private placement is that in the case a PIPE is used, new investors that happen to be early consumers are not allowed to sell their new stock in exchange for the consumption good. We start the next section by solving the trading problem in period 2 and highlighting the main di¤erence between both markets.
3 Equilibrium in the Basic Model
The Illiquidity Deadweight Loss
The following Lemma summarizes the main result from solving the trading model.
Lemma 2
If the …rm issues a PIPE, investors experience a deadweight loss as a result of the illiquidity of newly-issued shares. The aggregate cost is proportional to the returns on the project, the expected measure of early consumers and the proportion of shares issued:
where e = q h e h + q l e l :
Some comments are in order. The result in Lemma 2 allows us to obtain in a closed-form solution the illiquidity cost from …rst principles. In particular, such cost is larger the larger the proportion of new shares sold to PIPE investors, the larger the expected return on capital and the larger, on average, the proportion of early consumers. Note that this proportion can be quite sizeable in the case of restricted o¤erings since the period with resale restrictions can be as long as two years. We will use e as a measure of the importance of such illiquidity cost. The result above allows us to make de decision problem tractable since the illiquidity cost is proportional to :
Equilibrium in the Public Market
First, we solve for an equilibrium assuming that all …rms can do is to raise funds using the public market. This will serve as a benchmark towards solving the equilibrium in the private market as well as solving for the optimal issuance policy to be executed by the …rm in equilibrium.
In the absence of arbitrage, the price at which the new equity is sold should be such that investors, in expectation, do not make positive pro…ts. Total expected returns available to them are given by the expected returns from the investment, that is,
On the other hand, by de…nition, the amount raised in the o¤ering is I A, therefore the individual rationality constraint for new investors is
It is important to highlight that the expectations operator in the expressions above will depend on the nature of the equilibrium, assuming that agents update their prior probabilities according to Bayes' rule. Note also that the constraint is alleviated whenever available cash ‡ows are high, the number of shares issued is large and the cost of delaying investment is low.
The last piece that remains to be described in order to fully characterize the equilibrium is the decision on the number of new shares that need to be issued. We assume that managers act on behalf of existing shareholders, therefore they seek to maximize (1
This means that a …rm of type i solves the following program:
We summarize the equilibrium in the public market with the following proposition.
Proposition 1 (SEO Equilibrium) If dilution costs are not too large so that H type …rms invest, there exists a unique SEO pooling equilibrium. It is characterized in the following way:
i) At t = 0, both types of …rms decide to issue a proportion of new shares equal to
which is raised at t = 1:
ii) H type …rms make pro…ts
iii) L type …rms make pro…ts
If on the other hand, dilution costs are large, the unique equilibrium is one in which H type …rms do not invest in the project and L type …rms do, with …rm values being
Proof. See appendix.
The proposition above is just a straightforward application of Myers and Majluf (1984) . On the one hand, because both types of …rms are credit-worthy (assumption 1) the only equilibrium possible is a pooling one. Separation is not possible. As it has been argued in the literature, mispricing a¤ects negatively high-pro…t …rms and positively lower-pro…t types since they are able to masquerade with good types. The equilibrium therefore exhibits underinvestment: by looking at the H type …rm payo¤, only those with non-negative values will accept going ahead with the project. Such requirement is stronger than requiring a non-negative net present value since as we just mentioned mispricing a¤ects them negatively. Finally it is worth stressing that the mispricing is a more severe problem the less the internal funding available to the …rm (A), and the more severe the adverse selection problem is. This is captured by the proportion of L type …rms (1 ) times a normalized di¤erence in returns
. We now describe the equilibrium investment decision in a private market.
The Private Placement
We now turn towards describing the equilibrium of the model when the market available to both …rms is the private one (and only that.) Because one of the main features of such channel is that equity can be issued and sold before registering the securities, it allows …rms to raise capital more ‡exibly. The downside of this greater ‡exibility in timing investment decisions is that the security cannot be traded until registration is completed. 7 In Lemma 2 we claimed that this translates into investors paying an illiquidity cost that is proportional to the expected return from investing, the proportion of early consumers and the proportion of new shares sold at t = 0: We used the measure of early consumers (e) as an index of how important market illiquidity is.
Managers choose both investment timing and the amount issued to new investors in order to maximize existing shareholder's value, subject to the set of contracts being incentive-compatible and acceptable by both parties. That is, in a pooling equilibrium, they seek to
where q P (v H j s = s H ) = + (1 )x and the individual rationality constraint takes into account the illiquidity cost that the new issuance faces (eE 0 [R].)
By the standard argument stressed in the previous section, and since both …rm types have positive NPV investment projects, the more pro…table …rms cannot separate from the other ones, and the unique equilibrium is again a pooling one. The following proposition characterizes the equilibrium.
Proposition 2 If funds are raised using the PIPE market, there exists a pooling equilibrium in which i) at t = x …rms issue
where x is given implicitly by the …rst-order condition
ii) H type and L type …rms' values are, respectively,
By inspecting the value of the …rm in the proposition above, one can distinguish three elements: the NPV of the company including the new investment, the illiquidity cost faced by the …rm (which is invariant to …rm's type) and the mispricing term as a result of the asymmetry of information. Even in the absence of asymmetric information, the …rm does not appropriate the entire net present value of the new project. This "distortion" is the result of illiquidity costs. Second, just like in the public o¤ering equilibrium, underinvestment arises because of the asymmetry of information. However, the mispricing term is somewhat alleviated because the …rm announces to invest after t = 0 conveying a more precise signal on the expected pro…tability of the …rm. At the margin, this lower mispricing margin equals the direct cost of delaying investment.
The second thing to note is that, as is immediate from the proposition, L type …rms face underinvestment as well due to the illiquidity discount whereas H type …rms exhibit underinvestment from two sources: illiquidity and asymmetric information.
A closer look at the mispricing term for H type …rms reveals that such cost is largest when the …rm does not have available internal funds, A = 0, and/or when the asymmetric information is more severe, which we measure with the term H v R=E 0 (R): Finally, illiquidity a¤ects the agency cost as well. In particular, by increasing it. Intuitively, the illiquidity cost increases the actual number of shares that are needed to fund the same investment scale, since the mispricing is larger when more shares are needed, the total mispricing cost increases as a result.
It is also important to understand how the optimal investment timing is a¤ected by the parameters of the model. The following proposition summarizes such comparative statics.
Proposition 3 (Comparative Statics)
The optimal investment timing x increases with illiquidity costs (e), and investment scale (I), and decreases with the amount of available liquid assets (A), the pro…tability of the new project ( v R) and an increase in the returns for the low state R F holding R constant. (The e¤ ect of asymmetry of information is ambiguous.)
More illiquid shares worsen the mispricing factor caused by asymmetric information, thus increasing the marginal bene…t of delaying the announcement of the investment decision in order to capture the bene…ts of a more precise signal. Investment scale also increases the marginal bene…t of delaying investment more so than the direct cost. This is so because increasing the investment scale makes mispricing more costly, raising the marginal bene…t of delaying investments away from x = 0: Finally, the e¤ect of liquid assets (A) goes in the opposite way by the same argument just explained: more liquid assets lower the mispricing term. If the marginal cost of delaying investment goes down, we will optimally raise funds later to bene…t from a more precise signal. In a similar vein, if the loss under default is lower (R F higher), while keeping R constant, that is, an equal increase in R F and R S while make the company invest sooner, the reason being, again, that the marginal dilution cost is lower, and it pays to invest sooner in order to rip o¤ some rents from competitors.
An interesting case is the one in which v is very small, that is, investing earlier is not very valuable. Given the …rst-order condition as v ! 0; x ! 1 and the mispricing term vanishes since the signal is totally informative. In this limiting case …rms would choose a PIPE.
Before we turn to the most important result of the paper we …rst compare the issuance prices that would arise in the two equilibria described so far.
Proposition 4 (Illiquidity Discount)
The expected liquidity discount in a PIPE is given by
The proposition above shows how the discount at which the shares are sold under a PIPE is the compounded e¤ect of a direct e¤ect as a result of the illiquidity of the stock and an information asymmetry e¤ect since illiquidity increases the agency cost of equity, a¤ecting the optimal investment timing. Increasing e raises the discount proportionally to the expected returns to the investment (direct e¤ect.) On the other hand, it also delays the investment. If the asymmetry of information problem is important enough ((1 ) H v > v) an increase in e further raises the discount, above and beyond the direct e¤ect. On the other hand, though, if the asymmetry is mild the indirect e¤ect might end up making the discount lower. This result is consistent with the …ndings of Wruck and Wu (2007) . They …nd that relationships create value in private placements in the sense that price discounts are smaller when a relationship is involved. A relationship in the model would translate into a lower asymmetry of information and would mitigate the direct e¤ect of illiquidity, making the discount lower. Also, to the extend that the investment technology exhibits constant or increasing returns to scale (that is a larger I would increase R at least proportionally) the model predicts that a larger issuance size would also carry a larger illiquidity discount.
The Issuance Decision
Once we have characterized the equilibrium in each of the markets we turn into assessing the …rms investment decision. This amounts to deciding which market to use to raise funding in order to maximize existing shareholders'value.
In order to solve for this problem we use the results from proposition 1 and 2. However we have to consider two other potential separating equilibria where the two types issue di¤erent securities. These hybrid equilibria are: one where H type …rms choose to issue a PIPE whereas L type …rms prefer an SEO, and a reversed one where …rms switch the market around. We are able to prove that these hybrid do not arise as a PBE of the program and therefore we are left with the following result.
Proposition 5 (Issuance decision)
There exists a cuto¤ e e such that:
i) For e e e; the unique equilibrium is one in which both types issue a private placement of equity in order to raise funds for its investment opportunity, ii) for e > e e; …rms use a public o¤ ering.
Moreover, when asymmetries of information are important ( H v is large) …rms will tend to issue
PIPEs in order to invest later and reduce the mispricing cost. Finally, PIPEs are more bene…cial when available internal funds (A) are low. This is because potential dilution costs are larger. This suggests that smaller …rms or …rms that are more …nancially constrained will tend to pick a private placement …rst SEOs might dominate for …rms with more available cash ‡ows.
The result contained in the proposition above is intuitive. It suggests the following ranking of markets: if expected illiquidity is important, a public …rm should use a public placement, otherwise it should use a private placement. If asymmetric information is important, PIPEs might be ranked …rst, since its ‡exibility provides a mechanism to lower expected dilution costs, this is consistent with studies showing that …rms are more likely to issue a PIPE when asymmetries of information are larger (see Gomes and Phillips (2005) ). Moreover the last result of the proposition above is consistent with empirical studies showing that SEO issuances are larger in the amount raised than PIPEs.
Private Debt
As we mentioned in the introduction, the paper primarily focuses on the private/public dimension of equity …nancing. However, private placements are also made with debt instruments. In this section I solve for the optimal debt-like contract. I then analyze whether the private/public dimension of the problem alters the well-known pecking-order theory that arises in a public market (Myers and Majluf (1984) ). We will argue that within private placements the pecking order (internal funds …rst, then debt, then equity) need not hold. In this analysis, it is worth noting that debt contracts are assumed to face the same illiquidity problem than equity. If investors are hit by a liquidity shock they are not able to sell the claim and will face a loss. In expectation, that needs to be taken into account in the same way as it has in the previous section.
We start analyzing the case with safe debt. That is, let us …rst assume that net pro…ts in the low state are just equal to the investment amount needed from outside investors, R F (1 e) = I A:
The following proposition summarizes the main result when the equilibrium is compared to a private placement.
Proposition 6 (Riskless Debt) If (1 ) H v > v; using private debt allows the …rm to raise funds faster. That is , x P E > x P D : Also, pro…ts might be larger than with an equity contract. However, if the asymmetry of information is less important, there exists cases in which an equity contract allows for a faster investment and provides larger pro…ts.
The intuition behind the proposition above goes as follows. It is well-known that when asymmetric information is important, the mispricing becomes larger in an equity-like contract, a contract that is more sensitive to such problem, that is the reason why debt dominates equity. On the other hand, when such problem is less acute, the result might not hold. The reason is that dilution costs are now endogenous, given that the …rm can choose investment timing, which a¤ects both dilution costs and the NPV of the project. Because with a debt contract the …rm only makes pro…ts if the success state (R S ) is realized this a¤ects the optimal investment timing, which will likely have the …rm invest earlier than with an equity contract, causing dilution costs to be higher and pro…ts potentially lower.
Next proposition will be more precise on the instances when this is more likely. It is also worth noting the e¤ect of illiquidity. In a debt contract the illiquidity cost is not shared with the …rm in the lower state but solely beard by the investor. This increases the compensation given to the investor in the good state, the one in which the …rm makes positive pro…ts. This in turn a¤ects the choice of x in a way that might lower the potential bene…t of a debt contract.
Proposition 7 (Risky Debt) More generally, within a private placement of securities, the pecking order might not hold. Under some conditions private equity dominates private debt. These scenarios would involve, for instance, projects where the recovery rate (net of illiquidity costs) is low (R F (1 e)=(I A) small) and/or the normalized di¤ erence in pro…tability between states, R=R F ; is low.
The result above illustrates a relative disadvantage of a debt-like contract and also predicts that privately placed equity is more likely to be valuable (compared to a debt contract) when the recovery rate in case of default is low or the di¤erent in pro…tability between both states is low. As explained above for the case of safe debt, the reason is that dilution costs are now endogenous, given that the …rm can choose investment timing. Because with a debt contract the …rm only makes pro…ts if the success state (R S ) is realized this might cause the …rm to invest earlier than with an equity contract, raising dilution costs and hurting pro…ts. This is more likely to hold if the recovery rate is low, that is, when R F compared to I A is small. The reason is that, in this case, the two types of contracts di¤er more from each other in terms of their option structure (an equity contract resembles the payo¤ of a call option, a debt contract one of a put). Moreover, when illiquidity costs are relevant, debt has the undesirable feature of punishing the investor relatively more in the default state. Unlike an equity contract where part of the illiquidity cost is shared with the …rm. A company does not pay any of that cost in such state since all payo¤s go to new (debt) investors. Because of that, the …rm needs to raise the face value of debt, increasing the dilution cost. An equity contract might then be more desirable.
This distortion is more likely to bene…t equity when the recovery rate under default is small. In those cases the distortion from the illiquidity in the market creates a more severe disadvantage for debt. Figure 4 below depicts the value functions for both private debt and equity contracts in two numerical cases, each of which re ‡ect the dominance of either debt or equity in a private placement.
[ Figure 4 about here]
Finally, it is worth commenting on the fact that this is not the …rst paper arguing that the pecking order can be reversed. Another example is Fulghieri and Lukin (2001) , who argues that …rms might prefer to issue a more information-sensitive security in order to encourage information production by specialized investors thus inducing higher issuing prices (they do not distinguish among public and private markets.) Although we share the fact that dilution costs are endogenous, the mechanisms are quite distinct. They argue that information gathering is done costly by specialized (informed)
investors in a market microstructure model where a market maker adds up demand from informed and uninformed. Our model, in contrast, does not rely on a market microstructure model but argues that lower dilution costs can be attained by placing the security privately given that in this case only informed investors participate and the security is ‡exible enough to capture and bene…t from signals about the project's quality. Also, the reversal of the pecking order only happens within the private placement of securities.
Analysis and Empirical Predictions

On the Stock Price Announcement E¤ect of PIPEs
The potential reversal of the pecking order explained in the previous section (see Proposition 8) helps explaining the empirical regularity that PIPEs do not usually carry a negative stock price reaction, unlike SEOs. The argument behind negative stock price reactions to (public) equity issuances has been that if dilution costs are important, high-pro…tability borrowers might decide not to invest. If only low-pro…tability borrowers do invest, announcing an equity issuance is "bad" news. In this model, however, since private placements lower the asymmetry of information with an adequate timing of the investment decision, this allows high-pro…tability …rms that otherwise would have not invested to invest in a positive net present value project. If that is the case, announcing an unexpected investment (and notice that it should not be expected by the market otherwise it would have been priced already) …nanced via a private placement carries only a positive e¤ect that captures the positive net present value of the project and no negative signal since both types of …rms issue the security. Essentially a private placement loosens the participation constraint for H type companies (that is, it partially solves the underinvestment problem) allowing both types of companies to invest, something that might not be possible if the only channel available to them was a public placement. This is consistent with the empirical …ndings explained in the introduction which report a positive abnormal return around the announcement of a PIPE, this theory argues that the positive announcement e¤ect comes from the possibility of undertaking positive NPV projects by both better and worse …rms. to further assume that they are unexpected investment opportunities, which makes sense given the private nature of the issuance. In an SEO, on the other hand, it is more likely that the investment is expected, which is the usual assumption made to justify negative stock price reactions.
[ Figure 5 about here]
On the E¤ects of Sarbanes-Oxley
Our model can also be used to extract some policy implications. The model argues that SEOs are less ‡exible because the SEC legal requirements that …rms need to undertake in order to make a public placement create a gap between the investment decision and the implementation of such investment.
On the other hand, in a private placement this can be done simultaneously. One can then interpret SOX as increasing the in ‡exibility of public placements, increasing the relative advantage of PIPEs.
The model then predicts that it would be more likely that companies would use private placements after SOX was passed, other things equal. Although we are not aware of any formal test of this prediction, this can be seen as consistent with the fact that in the past few years larger companies have started using more private placements. Larger …rms are more likely to be at the margin between both types of channels and making the public one more costly through additional lack of ‡exibility might have caused an increased use of PIPEs among larger companies. This could also explain the increased use of this type of security after 2001.
This paper presents a theory that explains the decision of public …rms whether to use a private placement or a public one. A central element of such a theory is to model the value of …nancial ‡exibility that private placements possess. In short, private placements time investment decisions in order to bene…t from competitors and to reduce potential dilution costs due to asymmetric information.
We …nd that when illiquidity costs are important SEOs dominate, however when the are not, PIPEs are chosen. We show that when asymmetry of information is relevant, PIPEs dominate as well.
We then introducing private debt into the picture and show that withing the private placement of securities the traditional pecking order might be reversed, with equity ranking before debt. Finally we show how the model can explain some empirical regularities, such the current increase in the use of these types of securities and the positive stock price e¤ect when PIPEs are announced.
Proof of Lemma 1
Start de…ning P (s = s H j v H ) = a + bx and
Applying Bayes'theorem we have that
Using the de…nition provided for the signal and the conditions in (1) we impose P (v H j s H ; x = 0) = and P (v H j s H ; x = 1) = 1 and substituting in the expression above yields a = a 0 and a 0 + b 0 = 0:
Similarly,
Again imposing the conditions required in the de…nition, 
Proof of Lemma 2
In order to show the result of Lemma 1 we start solving for the prices in each state that will clear the market. First, since we assume
; there is no storage in equilibrium, that is, late consumers supply all the capital good to early consumers. The market clearing condition equates the demand for the consumption good with supply. Thus,
in the case the …rm does a public o¤ering, or
in the case the …rm issues a PIPE. The equation above captures the fact that only old shareholders with liquid shares are able to sell their stock if needed, whereas new shareholders are not able to sell them (they are however able to buy new shares in the secondary market if they need to.) The illiquidity of new shares raises the price, other things equal. We now turn to the calculation of expected utilities in both cases. We start with the aggregate expected utility in the case of a public o¤ering:
On the other hand, solving the same expression in the case of a PIPE yields
Proof of Proposition 1. The proof of this proposition is parallel to solving for a pooling equilibrium under asymmetric information. The proof is available upon request but it is standard in these models. For a general of treatment see Tirole (2006) .
Proof of Proposition 2
The program to be solved by the H type company in a pooling equilibrium is as follows:
Using the participation constraint for the investor one can rewrite the problem as
In order to prove that a solution exists we will apply the Intermediate Value theorem.
First, the FOC above is a continuous function in the domain of x: At x = 0 the FOC reads
On the other hand at x = 1 we have
To show why the last inequality holds, let us assume for a contradiction that
Regarding the last inequality even though we only assume 1 2 v R > (I A); in an interior solution pro…ts must be non-negative and so
Therefore there exists an x 2 (0; 1) such that the …rst-order condition is satis…ed. After some algebra one can also show that the second-order condition is satis…ed. The proof of that is available upon request.
Given that L type …rms are creditworthy, the only possible equilibrium is a pooling one, this result is standard in these models. See, for a general treatment, Tirole (2006) .
Proof of Proposition 3 (Comparative Statics)
De…ne 0 (x ) = 0 the …rst-order condition of the program and z a parameter of the model. Using the implicit function theorem it is easy to show that
Given that 00 (x ) < 0 at a maximum,
The result of the proposition follows after applying this result. That is,
where the last sign follows since 1
Proof of Proposition 4. Direct by substitution, using proposition 2.
Proof of Proposition 5
The proof of this proposition is done in several steps. To prove the …rst part, note that from Propositions 1 and 2 we have that the SEO and PIPE pro…ts for an H type …rm are
2 ) v respectively. At e = 0,
q(x ) > : On the other hand, P IP E is a continuos function of e and 0 P IP E (e) < 0: Since for e arbitrarily close to 1, P IP E becomes non-positive, there exists a e e such that for e e e; the unique pooling equilibrium consists of choosing a private placement, whereas e > e e means that the H type …rm will choose public placement and the L type …rm will follow.
For the second part of the proposition, note that dilution costs are proportional to H v: The larger H v is the more likely that the …rm will delay investing in order for investors to have a more precise signal. This will create a larger gap between the dilution costs under an SEO and those of a PIPE, bene…ting the later as long as e is not too large. Even when e is large, if v is small the …rm will be able to lower dilution costs enough to bene…t a private placement as well, despite illiquidity costs.
Finally there are two other equilibrium candidates. These would be those in which each type of …rm chooses a di¤erent type of placement: H type choosing a private placement and L types a public one, or H types choosing a public placement and L types a private one. These hybrid separating outcomes cannot be an equilibrium since given what H type …rms choose and L type …rm will always have the incentive to mimic what an H type does and receive higher pro…ts than the pro…ts from a separating equilibrium (which are the same as the pro…ts under perfect information.)
Proof of Proposition 6 and 7
Let's …rst solve the program under private debt …nancing. The simpli…ed program for an H type …rm, once we take into account the fact that the payment to the investor in the case the lower state of the world occurs is R F is as follows: In order to show this result, we …rst substitute the safe debt assumption into the …rst-order condition derived before, to obtain that
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The …gure above illustrates the regions in which the model predicts that
announcing an issuance will entail a positive or neutral reaction (blue, left region) or a negative reaction (red, top right region).
